Naval War College Review
Volume 2
Number 2 February

Article 3

1949

Economic Warfare - The Attack
Charles Cortez Abbott

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Abbott, Charles Cortez (1949) "Economic Warfare - The Attack," Naval War College Review: Vol. 2 : No. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

,..
Abbott: Economic Warfare - The Attack

ECONOMIC WARFARE

-

RESTRICTED

THE ATTACK

A lecture delivered by

Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott
at the Naval War College
October 21, 1948

Professor Spiegel in his book,
defines this subject as follows:

The Economics of Total War,

"Economic warfare is designed to destroy the enemy's
economic war potential by physically destroying war essential assets and by blockading supplies from abroad........"
It "requires the coordinated blending of military and econ
omic measures."
Colonel Clabaugh of the faculty of the Industrial College of

the Armed Forces in a recent lecture in that college's Economic
Mobilization course said:
"......so far as the literal and figurative meaning of the
words is concerned, the term 'economic warfare' could have
been applied to economic mobilization for war or to pro
duction or even to commercial rivalry in peace. But cus
tom and usage make language as well as law. Long before
we entered the war, in fact before the outbreak of war in
Europe, economic warfare had come to mean the strangula
tion of the enemy-blockade, literally, by ships at sea and
figuratively, by diplomatic and economic measures. 'Econ
omic warfare' should be used only in the special meaning
given to it by custom and usage....... ,Briefly, it is 'the sum
of all those measures which injure the enemy's war po
tential.' "

In order to place economic warfare in some perspective, it
may serve a useful purpose at this point to make a number of ob

servations regarding it. Economic warfare of course is not a new
Professor. Abbott has been on the faculty of Harvard University
since 1932-for the past several years as Professor of Business
Economics.
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development. It is probably as old as warfare itself. Certainly in
Plutarch's account of the wars of the Greeks and the Persians
there are numerous happenings which we would characterize as fall
ing within the orbit of economic warfare. In the Napoleonic wars
measures of ,economic attack and defense played a prominent part,
and in our own Civil War the blockade of the South was of very
great consequence.

With the passage of time, the realignment of nations, and
the development of new weapons, economic warfare continually
changes its form. The development of air power and of submarine
warfare has of. course greatly widened its scope and objectives. On

the other hand, total war on a global scale has tended to diminish the
feasibility of naval blockade in the older, narrower sense of blockad

ing a hostile coast line and has fostered a growth of new measures
which I will speak of in a moment.

It has been commonly observed that economic warfare en
compasses many ordinary peacetime practices of business, such as
foreign investment; patent interchange agreements,establishment of
branch plants.in foreign countries, and commercial relationships of
many kinds. At the other extreme are operations of a strictly mili

tary character, undertaken in wartime., that possess an economic
purpose, such as submarine warfare and the air attacks on the Ger
man synthetic oil plants at Leuna in the last war. In between these
extremes come such operations as our efforts to deprive the Axis of
Spanish and Portuguese wolfram through preclusive buying, or our

efforts through the use of ship warrants and denial of bunkering
facilities to force the Argentines to employ their merchant tonnage
in shipping services advantageous to us.

In general, the effectiveness of economic warfare increases
or decreases directly in proportion to the military strength and suc

cess of the nation or alliance.

Many illustrations of the validity of

6
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this proposition can be found. For example, the character of the
trade agreements which the United States was able to negotiate
with neutrals-Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey
changed rapidly and in our favor between 1942 and 1944 as allied
military successes increased. As fortune favored our arms it was
possible to put increasing pressure on neutral countries and areas

and, consequently, progressively to deprive the Axis of essential raw
materials. This observation perhaps is nothing more than a further
confirmation of the fact that economic warfare in itself can probab
ly never be a decisive factor independent of military action, although
it can very substantially contribute to military successes.

Probably economic warfare is most successful when a partic
ular action is undertaken on such a �cale and so rapidly that the
economy attacked has no chance to accommodate itself to the blow
or to develop substitute materials or alternative trade routes or con
nections, with the result that the effects of a sudden and unexpected
action tend to become cumulative. If the country is suddenly and

completely cut off from some item such as ball bearings, or if all

foreign trade relationships with neutrals are swiftly and violently

distorted, the effects on a country's economy will be very far reach
ing, particularly in a military sense. Reasoning of this type is of
course one of the bases for apprehension regarding a sneak attack
on industrial areas in the United States.

On the other hand, it is easy to overestimate the effects of
particular operations designed to accomplish economic dislocation.
The strategic bombing of German industry and transport prior to
the spring of 1944, for example, seemingly injured the German

economy much less than was currently believed in this cou�try. A
commonly quoted judgment of one of the officials of the British
Ministry of Economic Warfare is to the effect that MEW did not un
derestimate Germany's needs or resources, but that German in-
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genuity in developing substitutes for critical materials and com
ponents was greatly underestimated.

It is clear, of course, that there are two bases for economic

warfare.

The first may be described as the economic and business

facts characteristic of a nation's economy.

Economic and commer

cial geography, sources of raw materials, peacetime trade flows,

commercial and banking connections of important companies, the
location of key plants and industries-these determine the points in
a nation's position that are susceptible to economic attack.

Great

Britain, for example, was vulnerable to a food shortage; Nazi Ger
many was vulnerable to a shortage of gasoline. The second basis
is economic intelligence, or knowledge of these facts.

The focus of

such intelligence must be to determine the shortages that exist in the

economy at the outbreak of war or that appear during hostilities.

In order to prosecute economic warfare successfully the ne

cessity for the collection, collation, and analysis of economic in
telligence is self-evident.

Its importance can hardly be overesti

mated and it is essential in every phase of this type of operation,

from the selection of targets for strategic bombing to knowledge of
shortages in the enemy's territory.

A

great deal, probably a major portion, of the information

needed for an effective system of economic intelligence can be
gleaned from published sources.

The problem is one of organ

izing to do the job, especially in peacetime.

In the last war there

was a great deal of overlapping, confusion, and duplication among
the agencies concerned with this task, and there is no question

that far too much time elapsed before an effective economic in

telligence organization was achieved.

The inescapable conclusion

is that much of the job of collecting economic intelligence can and
should be done prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

8
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A very large part though perhaps not all of the necessary
information that is not available from published sources prob
ably exists in the files of government · departments and of busi
ness concerns in this country. The logic of the problem of as
sembling data for economic warfare requires that any particu
lar country base its intelligence system on the organizations and
sources of information at its command. (Traditionally, Great
Britain has used shipping concerns, banks, foreign trade con
nections, and its control of the international news orgahizations
for this purpose, in addition to its diplomatic and consular repre
sentatives; Germany, as we all know, used German companies or
plants located abroad, patent interchange agreements, and the
various kinds of German emigrant societies; Russia clearly uses
the Communist Party and its fellow travelers for this purpose).
It is doubtful if any systematic effort has been made to collect and
collate information in the hands of leading American business
corporations with far-flung foreign connections, such as the large
banks, General Motors, Standard of New Jersey, International
Harvester, and so on. The omission is a matter of great regret,
since if such information were collected and collated it would
certainly be very comprehensive.
The need for this kind of effort appears to be the greater
since, insofar as I understand thei:;e matters, there is relatively
little knowledge of the workings of the Russian economy in this
country, at least as compared with other major powers. This lack
of an integrated body of data makes offensive economic warfare
against the Soviet considerably more difficult than would other
wise be the case. Incidentally, I believe that careful analysis of
the trade agreements that Russia has concluded since V-J Day,
and is concluding, both with countries inside and with countries
outside the Iron Curtain, should be one of the more fruitful
sources of this kind of knowledge, in that such agreements might
suggest actual or potential shortages in the Russian economy.
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We come now to the techniques of economic warfare-block
ade, export licensing, preclusive buying, control of shipping, black
lists, blocking of foreign assets, and all the rest.
Historically, the backbone of economic warfare has been the
naval blockade in the strict sense of the word. Reliance has been
placed on the stationing of naval vessels on an enemy coast and out
side enemy harbors, on patrol of the sea lanes, on observation of ship

ping in neutral roa:dsteads, and on the careful designation of contra
band and, when possible, its seizure. During the two World Wars
this pattern has been altered by three well-defined developments.
The first was the growth of the navicert system, a system which re

sultE!d in great economies in the use of warships in supervising neu

tral shipping.. The second has been the development of the long dis

tance or paper blockade, which in its more advanced form seeks not
only to cut off all supplies for the enemy at the point of origin,

namely, in neutral countries, but even goes so far as to mould the
economy of neutral territory to your own use. The third circum
stance has been the breakdown of distinctions between contraband
and noncontraband goods, whatever the lawyers may say.

The reasons for these changes are clear. Global warfare and
conflicts between world-wide alliances, together with the develop
ment of new weapons such as the airplane and the submarine, have
greatly increased the need for employing naval vessels in strictly
naval operations and on convoy duty.. Conversely, the amount of
naval vessels' time available for blockade purposes has been re
duced. Furthermore, the larger the land mass and the volume of
resources controlled by the enemy, the fewer are the objectives that
can be achieved by a close blockade. The number of strategic items
in short supply for the Nazis in 1942 was really very small
petroleum was perhaps the only item in which shortage ever be
came acute.

Moreover, the logics of total war on a global scale
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make useless any distinctions between contraband and noncontra
band items. Finally, the necessities of total war require that a
combatant. not only devote all of his resources to the war effort but
also, so far as is possible, compel neutral nations to devote their
resources also to purposes advantageous to him. In pursuit of this
objective the combatant, of course, makes use of shipping con
trols, trade agreements, preclusive buying, financial measures, and
any other procedures available to him·.
An ancillary purpose sought in the effort to control the
trade of neutrals is to deprive the enemy of any advantages of trade
with other countries or the use of any assets that he owns located
outside his own boundaries. The ultimate goal is to deprive him of
the benefits that arise from the fact that he is a member of a com
munity of nations.
With reference to the navicert system, . it should be pointed
out that the Navy has three, perhaps four functions to perform un
der this procedure: the issue of the navicert, although this can per
haps be done by other agencies; apprehension of blockade runners;
the enforcement of the rules of blockade at control points; and per
iodic spot checks of merchant vessels on the high seas to ensure that
the blockade rules are being observed.
I

Should a condition of open hostilities develop between· this
country and the Soviet there can be little doubt that the measures of
economic warfare existing at the end of World War II would be
quickly reimposed. The export control measures which, as you
know, were originally instituted under the Export Control Act of
July, 1940 as a means of conserving scarce items, would be re
instituted. They would be reimposed partly for their original pur
pose of conservation, partly as a means of putting pressure on and
bargaining with neutral areas or with areas producing resources
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essential to our own effort, and partly to ensure that no products of
American fabrication were exported and fell into enemy hands.
War Trade Agreements, which are essentially a mechanism
for rationing noncombatant areas and for bringing the operation
of their economies into conformance with your own needs, would be
quickly negotiated. The rationing of neutral or noncombatant areas
has a number of separate aspects, each one of which merits atten
tion. In the first place, you cannot afford to give these areas all
they want of many commodities, or even all the shipping space that
they want. In the last war, the East Coast of South America was
not only severely rationed as regards its receipts of newsprint and
steel but also as regards shipping space allocated to it. In the
second place, it is important that only the essential needs of neutral
areas be satisfied; otherwise it is entirely possible that scarce items
may be reexported to the enemy. In the third place, rationing of
the items that these areas want from you is the best lever for as
suring that you get the supplies from them that are needed in your
war program. In the last war it was made very explicit by the
Belgian Congo that continued shipments of scarce minerals, fats
and oils and fibers were contingent upon the Congo's receipt of
manufactured goods and such picturesque items as. old clothes and
tinware essential for trade with the natives.
The injury to the Russian war effort that such measures
might inflict would in general be determined by the extent to
which the Russian economy and war potential is dependent upon
imports of raw materials, components, and technical skills from
abroad. I will not attempt to appraise this matter, since the Rus
sian war potential is the subject of another lecture in your course.
I would like to suggest, however, that the effect of these
measures might be influenced to some extent by another factor,
namely, the amount of territory controlled by the Russians. The
12
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greater the size of the land mass controlled by a military . economy
the less it tends to be subject to the pressures of economic warfare.
When Nazi Germany overran Poland, the Balkans, and Norway she
greatly increased the resources at her command, not the least of
which was man power. On the other hand, the addition of terri
tory may lead to greater shortages of certain kinds. For example,
Holland is a deficit food area, and the fact that the Nazis overran

the Netherlands must have increased the pressure on their own food
supplies. One may presume that the use of French industrial ca
pacity by the Germans increased the pressure on German petrol
eum resources.

The fact that the United States welded Latin

America to our war economy-insofar as we did-required that we

supply Latin America with minimum amounts of shipping services,
newsprint, flour and so forth. As is well known, our efforts to
service the Caribbean and the East Coast of South America re
sulted in a number of submarine sinkings that might not other

wise have taken place and consequently intensified the shortage of
merchant shipping. In short, if Russia overran Western Europe

it would increase her war potential, but it would also increase her
vulnerability to certain types of economic pressure, though prob
ably not in equal degree.

If war between the United States and the Soviet should
break ou:t, the long distance or so-called paper blockade, with its
three basic instruments, the navicert, the ship's navicert, and the
ship's warrant, would certainly be imposed immediately.
As you know, the navicert originated in the First World
War while the United States was still a neutral. It was originally
a device for expediting the shipment of noncontraband goods from
one neutral country to another, a sort of permit for passage through
the blockade, given at the point of origin. It speedily developed
into a system of controlling all goods passing in trade between the

neutral countries.
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Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

9

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 2, Art. 3

RESTRICTED

A ship's navicert which was a logical outgrowth of the
navicert for a particular consignment, was given when all the items
in a ship's .manifest had been navicerted, and permitted a vessel
to make a single voyage through naval controls. The ship's navi
cert provided a description of the ship and its proposed itinerary;
a list of officers, crew, and passengers; a description of the cargo?
ship's stores, mail, and .money; and an account of the source, des
tination, consignor, and consignee of the cargo. When the appli
cation for a ship's navicert was received, the crew and passenger
lists were checked, and 09jectionable persons were removed before
the issue of the navicert. The effect of the navicert system was that
all unnavicerted ships and cargo became subject to immediate
seizure.
A ship's warrant entitled a vessel to the use of British and
Allied port facilities-bunkering, ship stores, repairs, and so forth.
In order to receive a warrant the owner agreed that no vessel
owned or operated by him would sail to or from the navicert area
without a ship's navicert, that he would not sell or part with ef
fective control of any vessel owned by him without the approval of
the proper authorities, and that he would not employ any enemy
company for the purpose of obtaining insurance or other facil
ities. In addition, fleet owners were generally required to charter
portions of their fleets to the issuing authority; in the last war
that meant either the British Ministry of War Transport or the War
Shipping Administration. I have always been under the im
pression that the presence of Swedish vessels in the Pacific in
services designated by the British was a result of this kind of lever
on neutral shipping.
The extent to which the imposition of shipping controls may
directly jnjure the Soviets seems to me very problematical. On the
other hand, the use of these controls would clearly increase the re14
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sources at the command of this country and of 0-reat Britain, and
it is in this respect that they would be chiefly useful.
If the cold war should turn into a hot war, it seems certain
that proclaimed lists of individuals and of business concerns com
mercially "untouchable" would be speedily developed and that Rus
sian-owned funds and other assets in territories under our control
would be sequestered. Here again the direct injury to the Russians
would be doubtful. Certainly there would be no important body of
Russian assets owned in t�is country to sequester-nothing like
the $7,955,000,000 of assets that were blocked in this courttry dur
ing the last war.
In short, the ocean-borne commerce of Russia, particularly
that part that could be reached by the navicert system or the pro
claimed list, seems to be very important to the Soviet. Her land
bounµaries to the Near East and the Far East would be difficult if
not impossible to seal through measures of economic warfare. The
conclusion is, I think, that strategic bombing would be far more
effective in breaking down the Russian war potential than would
these other mechanisms.
By way of conclusion let us consider some of the economic
aspects of the cold war. These considerations are important on
their own merits. More importantly, the· degree of success with
which the United States and the Soviets prosecute their respective
programs of economic warfare prior to the time hostilities break
out-if they do-will greatly influence the possibilities of economic
warfare after the event.
The general pattern is clear. The Soviets have their policy
of economic erosion; the United States has the Marshall Plan.
The chief, the most interesting, and the most baffling charac-
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teristic of the Russian policy is its destructive character.

The

erosion, undermining and· collapse of other economies serves the

Soviet purpose. Only in minor degree, apparently, are the Russians

interested in preserving the productive capacity or trade connections

of territories under their control and in adapting these facilities

for their own use.

In this respect Russian policy largely differs

from other types of economic penetration that the world has seen.

On the whole, and notwithstanding some well-known exceptions,

the British and the Germans have traditionally sought to pre

serve the economic potential of an area being penetrated, and

even to build upon it. Their purpose for the most part was to

turn the productive capacity and facilities in such territories to

their own use, not to destroy them.

As I have said, Russian policy is furthered by .the spread

of economic chaos, by civil disturbance, the diminution of production

and trade, inflation of currency, dislocation of channels of trade,

and the disappearance of plants and individual business concerI).s.

One of my friends points out that the Russians are masters of

"economic cannibalism," the absorption or destruction. of econ

omic activity outside Russia, leaving the Russian economy, poor
as it may be, without a rival.

In this policy, especially in its early stages, manipulation of

the monetary and banking· structure is a key element.

As we all

know, inflation of the currency and prostitution of the banking
syste:r:n in a given a!:ea is the quickest way to check the economic
processes of production and distribution and to discourage. busi

nessmen and the spirit of enterprise.

and credit was recognized by Lenin.

The importance of money

Both Nazis and Communists

have used control of money and banking mechanisms as a means

of breaking down the economies of satellite, peripheral states,

and

the position that control of the currency has assumed in the Ber
lin situation seems to be not wholly accidental.
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As against this program the United States has as a counter
measure the Marshall Plan, with all the implications and ramifica
tions covered by that phrase. It is commonly said that this plan
is designed for the economic restoration of Europe, but this seems
to be not a wholly adequate statement. In an immediate sense the
plan was designed to check economic deterioration in western
Europe; in a larger sense it is presumably intended to restore an
economic balance of power in Europe, a sine qua non of the restora

tion of a military balance of power.

Certain aspects of the Marshall Plan, however, particularly

aspects that are significant under economic warfare, I do not think

are fully appreciated. In what I am about to say I am relying
chiefly on three very competent documents: A Survey of the
Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe, United Nations

Eco.nomic Commission for Europe, Geneva, March 30, 1948; a sup
plementary document published by the same source, Selected World
Economic Indices, Lake Success, July, 1948; and The Eighteenth
Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, pub-·
lished at Basie, Switzerland, June 14, 1948.

It

does not seem to be valid to look on the Marshall Plan as

a means of restoring European industrial production to prewar
levels. Such a restoration had in fact been substantially achieved
before the end of 1947. Industrial production of 14 major nations
of Europe, excluding Germany, in the latter half of that year was

on the average 99% of prewar production; 8 nations* which in
1938 accounted for 34 % of European production had exceeded
prewar output, in some instances by considerable margins. This
level of production seems to have been achieved in large measure
because of the increased labor supply in Europe and by a more
* Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.

17
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complete use of the supply than was the case in 1938, since
European postwar output per man-hour has been much lower than
in the prewar period. The conclusion is, I think, that in the field
of industrial production the logical aim of the Marshall Plan must
be to raise output above prewar levels. This can take place only

over a period of time, as capital equipment is increased. Itis also
probable that an increase in facilities is a necessary condition for a

rise in the man-hour output to something like its prewar level.

In the field of trade the picture is very different. In current
prices, European trade is above the prewar· level, but in terms of
1938 prices it remains substantially below that of 1939. The Bank
of International Settlements Report states: "Expressed in real

value, the trade of European countries with one another in 1947

-

represented only 56 % of the prewar volume, while Europe's trade

in the non-European countries·amounted to 78% as regards exports
,,
and 106 % as regards imports______ The relatively high level of im.:.

ports of course

fa in good part attributable to American generosity.

The chief area in which thi� "deficiency" in intra-European

trade appears is in the drop in German trade with Western

Europe (something like one• billion dollars of trade in each di
rection having disappeared), and secondarily in the shrinkage of
trade flowing between western Europe and central and eastern
European countries. The conclusion appears to be that a major ob

jective of American policies must be an increased volume of
European trade. Accomplishment of this goal will in turn be
largely dependent upon the establishment of sound monetary con
ditions, balanced budgets, and relaxation of. controls· upon foreign
exch,ange and international commerce. These. problems of course
are chiefly domestic problems for the countries concerned. Insofar
as the· Marshall Plan does not induce or force attainment of these
conditions it will not realize its potentialities.

18
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In some ways the major European problem is the loss to

Europe, as the result of the war, of "invisible receipts" from
foreign invesments, shipping, insurance, and so forth.

The Bank

of International Settlements Report states that in the period 1933-

1938, "The net income from Europe's investment in non-European

countries was equal to about $1.4 milliard ... , .. and accounted for

about one-quarter of Europe's total imports from non-European

countries; iri 1947 the corresponding net income would seem to
have been only $400 million, some 30 percent of what it was be

fore the war."

Here again the conclusion is plain.

Unless

Europe, during the period in which this country supplies aid, so

reorganizes its economy as to adapt itself to these new conditions
the Marshall Plan will fall short of its purposes. But this adapta
tion is again essentially a domestic problem, or perhaps a com

plex of domestic problems, for European countries.

The Marshall

Plan in and of itself here can do little more than buy time---time for
the European economy to adjust itself.
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